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PatchCore step by step

Optional · supplementary note 6 of 6 for DLCV 14 · Robustness: Distribution Shift, Adversarial Examples and Anomalies. Nothing in the main text depends on it; citation numbers refer to the reference list at the bottom of this page.

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Supplementary notes · 6

  1. Effective robustness and accuracy on the line
  2. Test-time entropy minimization
  3. Domain-adversarial training and the gradient-reversal layer
  4. Attack settings that decide an evaluation
  5. Randomized smoothing in practice
  6. PatchCore step by step

Paper guides · 3

  1. Madry et al., “Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Adversarial Attacks” (ICLR 2018)
  2. Athalye et al., “Obfuscated Gradients Give a False Sense of Security” (ICML 2018)
  3. Gulrajani and Lopez-Paz, “In Search of Lost Domain Generalization” (ICLR 2021)

Deep Learning for Computer Vision

  1. 02 · Deep Image Classification
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This note gives the details of PatchCore’s patch features, coreset selection and scoring that the main text summarized [42].

Patch features with local context. Let ϕj(x)∈Rc∗×h∗×w∗\phi_j(\mathbf{x}) \in \mathbb{R}^{c^* \times h^* \times w^*} be the feature map at level jj of an ImageNet-pre-trained network, with c∗c^* channels on an h∗×w∗h^* \times w^* grid, and ϕj(x,h,w)∈Rc∗\phi_j(\mathbf{x}, h, w) \in \mathbb{R}^{c^*} the feature vector at grid position (h,w)(h, w). For an odd neighbourhood size pp, the neighbourhood of (h,w)(h, w) is

Np(h,w)={(a,b):∣a−h∣≤⌊p/2⌋, ∣b−w∣≤⌊p/2⌋},\mathcal{N}_p^{(h,w)} = \{(a, b) : |a - h| \le \lfloor p/2 \rfloor,\ |b - w| \le \lfloor p/2 \rfloor\},

and the locally aware feature is an aggregation, adaptive average pooling in the paper, of the feature vectors in that neighbourhood. By default, features from blocks 2 and 3 of the network are combined, so that each patch feature mixes finer and coarser information [42]. The set of all such features over all normal training images forms the memory bank M\mathcal{M}.

Coreset selection. The goal is a subset MC⊂M\mathcal{M}_C \subset \mathcal{M} of a chosen size such that every feature in M\mathcal{M} is close to some feature in MC\mathcal{M}_C. PatchCore uses the minimax facility location objective

MC∗=arg⁡min⁡MC⊂M max⁡m∈M min⁡n∈MC∥m−n∥2,\mathcal{M}_C^{*} = \arg\min_{\mathcal{M}_C \subset \mathcal{M}}\ \max_{\mathbf{m} \in \mathcal{M}}\ \min_{\mathbf{n} \in \mathcal{M}_C} \lVert \mathbf{m} - \mathbf{n} \rVert_2,

the largest distance from any stored feature to its nearest kept feature [42]. This problem is NP-hard, so it is approximated greedily: start from one feature, then repeatedly add the feature whose distance to the current subset is largest (the greedy_coreset function in the main snippet). The paper also applies a random linear projection to reduce the dimension during selection, to save time. A random subsample of the same size would keep mostly common patches and drop rare normal ones, which then look anomalous at test time.

Scoring. For a test image with patch features P(xtest)\mathcal{P}(\mathbf{x}_{\text{test}}), find the test patch that is farthest from its nearest memory feature,

mtest,∗,m∗=arg⁡max⁡mtest∈P(xtest) arg⁡min⁡m∈MC∥mtest−m∥2,s∗=∥mtest,∗−m∗∥2.\mathbf{m}^{\text{test},*}, \mathbf{m}^{*} = \arg\max_{\mathbf{m}^{\text{test}} \in \mathcal{P}(\mathbf{x}_{\text{test}})}\ \arg\min_{\mathbf{m} \in \mathcal{M}_C} \lVert \mathbf{m}^{\text{test}} - \mathbf{m} \rVert_2, \qquad s^{*} = \lVert \mathbf{m}^{\text{test},*} - \mathbf{m}^{*} \rVert_2 .

The image score ss re-weights s∗s^* by how isolated m∗\mathbf{m}^* is within the memory bank: if the nearest memory feature is itself far from its own neighbours Nb(m∗)\mathcal{N}_b(\mathbf{m}^*) (the bb nearest memory features), it is a rare normal pattern, and the score is increased [42]:

s=(1−exp⁡∥mtest,∗−m∗∥2∑m∈Nb(m∗)exp⁡∥mtest,∗−m∥2) s∗.s = \Big(1 - \frac{\exp \lVert \mathbf{m}^{\text{test},*} - \mathbf{m}^{*} \rVert_2}{\sum_{\mathbf{m} \in \mathcal{N}_b(\mathbf{m}^{*})} \exp \lVert \mathbf{m}^{\text{test},*} - \mathbf{m} \rVert_2}\Big)\, s^{*} .

The per-patch distances, placed back at their grid positions, upsampled to the input resolution by bilinear interpolation and smoothed with a Gaussian, give the segmentation map [42].

Pitfalls. The memory bank grows with the number of training images and the feature resolution, so the coreset size trades speed against coverage. Normal variation that never appears in training (a new batch of material, new lighting) is flagged as anomalous, which is correct for a sensory anomaly detector but may not be what the factory wants; MVTec AD 2 adds lighting-change test scenarios for this reason [41]. And the ImageNet features may not suit very different imaging (X-ray, dark-field illumination).

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