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Attack settings that decide an evaluation

Optional · supplementary note 4 of 6 for DLCV 14 · Robustness: Distribution Shift, Adversarial Examples and Anomalies. Nothing in the main text depends on it; citation numbers refer to the reference list at the bottom of this page.

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Supplementary notes · 6

  1. Effective robustness and accuracy on the line
  2. Test-time entropy minimization
  3. Domain-adversarial training and the gradient-reversal layer
  4. Attack settings that decide an evaluation
  5. Randomized smoothing in practice
  6. PatchCore step by step

Paper guides · 3

  1. Madry et al., “Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Adversarial Attacks” (ICLR 2018)
  2. Athalye et al., “Obfuscated Gradients Give a False Sense of Security” (ICML 2018)
  3. Gulrajani and Lopez-Paz, “In Search of Lost Domain Generalization” (ICLR 2021)

Deep Learning for Computer Vision

  1. 02 · Deep Image Classification
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This note lists the choices inside an attack that change the reported robust accuracy, and what AutoAttack automates.

Step size and number of steps. PGD with TT steps of size α\alpha can move at most TαT\alpha in each coordinate. With Tα<εT\alpha \lt \varepsilon, it cannot reach the corners of the ℓ∞\ell_\infty ball, where FGSM-like solutions lie. A common rule, used in our snippet, is α=2.5 ε/T\alpha = 2.5\,\varepsilon / T: Madry et al. used it with T=100T = 100 in their evaluations at other budgets and in ℓ2\ell_2, so that the boundary of the ball can be reached from any starting point inside it [23]. Too large a step makes PGD oscillate between corners; too small a step stalls. AutoAttack’s PGD variant replaces the fixed step by a schedule: at preset checkpoints it halves the step size if the loss has not increased often enough since the last checkpoint [30].

Random restarts. The loss is not concave in δ\boldsymbol{\delta}, so different random starts reach different local maxima. An evaluation should take, for each test image, the best result over several restarts; an image counts as robust only if every restart fails.

The loss. Cross-entropy can saturate: when the model is very confident, its gradient is tiny and the attack makes little progress, which is one mechanism of gradient masking. The Carlini–Wagner margin loss,

LCW(x′,y)=max⁡k≠yzk(x′)−zy(x′),\mathcal{L}_{\text{CW}}(\mathbf{x}', y) = \max_{k \ne y} z_k(\mathbf{x}') - z_y(\mathbf{x}'),

where zkz_k are the logits, becomes positive exactly when the attack succeeds and does not saturate in the same way [26]. AutoAttack adds the Difference of Logits Ratio loss, which is invariant to shifting and rescaling the logits, whereas cross-entropy is invariant only to shifting [30].

ℓ2\ell_2 PGD. For the ℓ2\ell_2 ball, the step follows the gradient direction normalized to a fixed length instead of its sign [23], x′←x′+α g/∥g∥2\mathbf{x}' \leftarrow \mathbf{x}' + \alpha\, \mathbf{g}/\lVert \mathbf{g} \rVert_2 with g=∇xL\mathbf{g} = \nabla_{\mathbf{x}} \mathcal{L}, and the projection rescales δ\boldsymbol{\delta} to length ε\varepsilon when it is longer: δ←δ⋅min⁡(1,ε/∥δ∥2)\boldsymbol{\delta} \leftarrow \boldsymbol{\delta} \cdot \min(1, \varepsilon / \lVert \boldsymbol{\delta} \rVert_2), followed by clipping to [0,1][0, 1]. (Clipping after rescaling keeps the perturbation inside the ball because clipping can only shorten it.)

Targeted versus untargeted, and which test images. Untargeted robust accuracy is the fraction of test images for which no attack in the ensemble finds any wrong label. Report it on the full test set (or a stated subset), together with clean accuracy on the same images; robust accuracy cannot exceed clean accuracy, because a misclassified clean image counts as already broken.

Checklist. Norm and ε\varepsilon (and the pixel scale it refers to); attacks used; steps, step size and restarts; losses; whether the attack was adapted to the defense; number of test images. AutoAttack’s value is that most of these choices are fixed and the same for everyone [30], which is why RobustBench uses it [24].

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